1 Introduction
This paper presents a concept for teaching ethics in landscape planning. This concept begins with practical, tangible questions instead of beginning with ethical theories. The reason for this approach is didactical: a concept that begins with ethical theories might face the difficulty of explaining why ethical theories are important for students of landscape planning. In contrast, practical questions stimulate students’ interest in the subject. Being aware of the is-ought gap whilst exploring practical questions will lead to the ethical questions. Ethical questions also call for answers. It is worthwhile finding out what ethical theories can contribute to landscape planning. We begin with an example: the selection of a site for wind turbines.

2 Ad hoc Judgement
The students are given some information on potential sites for wind turbines, and have to choose the most suitable site. They form teams who have to make a preliminary decision and give reasons for their decision. This ad hoc judgement shows the students that many questions will have to be considered before a final decision.

The students have to prepare two lists of open questions. One list covers the ethical questions and the other list the empirical questions. Typically, the students find it difficult to specify ethical questions. Sometimes they find none. But they find it easy to specify empirical questions. The empirical list will be long and we single out two typical questions.

1. Which site is already degraded by infrastructure facilities?
2. Which site is the most efficient one in terms of wind availability?

The article presents an approach to teaching ethics in landscape planning. It demonstrates that seemingly factual questions of landscape planning imply normative and evaluative propositions. The example of a wind turbine site selection illustrates how David Hume’s remarks on the is-ought gap can highlight the connection between practical questions of landscape planning and ethical theories like utilitarianism and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice.
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1739-40/1960: 469-470) teaches that this argument is logically imperfect. He highlights the difference between is and ought. He found that the authors of moral systems first proceed “in the ordinary way of reasoning” using is and is not and then all of a sudden use ought and ought not in their propositions. The direct conclusion from facts to norms is criticized as is-ought fallacy. The argument above, is an example for such an is-ought fallacy. The presupposition uses is, and the conclusion contains ought. The is-ought fallacy can be explained with an analogy: to mix an alcoholic cocktail you need at least one alcoholic ingredient. Pina Colada contains rum, pineapple juice, and coconut cream. If you have no rum, you can only mix a Virgin Colada. Analogously, the propositions of a normative conclusion must include at least one norm. Otherwise the conclusion is logically defective.

The above argument A is incomplete. It has no normative presupposition, but draws a normative conclusion. We can easily complete the missing normative presupposition: “We ought to concentrate infrastructure facilities in order to preserve areas of unspoiled nature”. Now argument A is complete. Of course we can also introduce a different normative presupposition: “For reasons of fairness infrastructure facilities ought to be distributed equally” (Argument B). This will lead to a very different conclusion. Table 1 shows that the same descriptive presupposition may lead to different conclusions.

The analysis of the arguments may seem a little pedantic. But it is necessary: it illuminates the implicit normative content of an assumedly empirical question. Now we have an obvious ethical question: which normative presupposition is more substantiated, A or B?

Question 2 “Which site is most efficient in terms of wind availability?” also lacks the normative proposition. The implicit normative proposition probably is: the most efficient site ought to be preferred.

4 Ethical Theories Behind Normative Presuppositions

Normative presuppositions must not just be stated, but have to be substantiated. The claim in argument B is: “For reasons of fairness infrastructure facilities ought to be distributed equally”. The claim resulting from question 2 is: “The most efficient site ought to be preferred”. A plea for the most efficient solution is usually based on an ethical theory that goes back to the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1789/1907). The central idea of utilitarianism is that decisions should be made on the basis of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In a utilitarian view the sum of happiness is the most important objective. Fairness is also relevant but only as means to maximise the sum of happiness. This may even require a disproportionate distribution of burdens to increase the sum of happiness. Imposing a high burden (e.g. wind turbines) on few persons at efficient sites will bring about a higher yield of electricity. If the choice of efficient sites raises the sum of happiness, utilitarianism will lead to a disproportionate distribution. Argument B claims an equal distribution of the burdens that wind turbines bring about. Provided that all persons benefit to the roughly same extent from electric energy, fairness demands that they have to accept the same burden of infrastructure, in this case wind turbines. If the sites for wind turbines were chosen on the basis of an equal distribution of burdens instead of efficiency-criteria, efficiency would drop. We have a conflict of objectives between equal distribution and efficiency. The American philosopher John Rawls provides a solution for this conflict. In his Theory of Justice (1971: 302) he suggests the Difference Principle. This principle demands that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are […] to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged […]”. The example of distributing a cake explains the idea behind Rawls’s Difference Principle. On one condition it is preferable to receive the smallest piece of an unequally divided, but big cake instead of a piece of an equally divided but small cake: the unequal piece has to be bigger than the equal piece. In our example of a site for wind turbines the neighbours of the wind-efficient sites are the least advantaged because they suffer from the turbines. But efficient sites lower the costs of electricity for them as well. An unequal distribution is justified as long as the advantage of an efficient site is higher for the neighbours than the
disadvantage of an unequal distribution is for them. If we focus on wind turbines alone, many neighbours of wind turbines might prefer higher electricity prices. But the neighbours of wind-turbines also benefit from other unequal distributions of infrastructure like motorways, waste incineration plants or airports. This improves the chances for an unequal distribution to be acceptable even for the least advantaged.

5 Conclusion
To place emphasis on the gap between is and ought opens the door for ethical considerations. Seemingly factual questions may imply normative or evaluative propositions. The attention to the is-ought gap highlights for example the questions of distributive justice which are omnipresent, but often not fully considered in landscape planning decisions. We should address the normative questions explicitly and discuss them with our students.

References
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